By Marc A. Thiessen
White apartment speechwriter Marc Thiessen was once locked in a safe room and given entry to the main delicate intelligence whilst he used to be tasked to write down President George W. Bush’s 2006 speech explaining the CIA’s interrogation application and why Congress should still authorize it. Few recognize extra approximately those CIA operations than Thiessen, and in his new ebook, relationship catastrophe, he files simply how potent the CIA’s interrogations have been in foiling assaults on the USA, penetrating al-Qaeda’s excessive command, and supplying our army with actionable intelligence. Thiessen additionally indicates how reckless President Obama has been in shutting down the CIA’s software and freeing mystery files that experience aided our enemies. relationship catastrophe proves:How the CIA software thwarted particular lethal assaults opposed to the U.S.Why “enhanced interrogation” was once no longer torture through any moderate criminal or ethical standardHow the knowledge received through “enhanced interrogation” couldn't were obtained the other wayHow President Obama’s activities given that taking place of work have left the USA even more susceptible to attackIn chilling element, Thiessen unearths how shut the terrorists got here to impressive back, how intelligence won from “enhanced interrogation” again and again stymied their plots, and the way President Obama’s dismantling of this CIA application is inviting catastrophe for the USA.
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Extra resources for Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America Safe and How Barack Obama Is Inviting the Next Attack
In the revitalized program,Cheney says, "there were a certain set of techniques that we indicatedwe would use in the future, but we reserved the right to use any of theothers should they be necessary. We set up a process where the CIADirector could come to the president if he had an especially difficultcase, or critical moment, and get the authority to use other means. Hayden's goal was effectiveness, balanced by political sustainability. But there were intense internal disagreements over what that balanceshould be.
In other words, acaptured terrorist like KSM could do more than give the agencyadditional pieces of the puzzle; he could tell the agency how all thevarious pieces of the puzzle they had assembled fit together. There was no other way to get this critical information. This was especially true in the early years of the war on terror,when we knew almost nothing about the enemy that had attackedus. As Vice President Cheney told me, "There was an awful lot we didnot know about al Qaeda at the time of 9/11.
Initially, Zubaydah offered up some nominal information that hethought we already knew, in order to give the impression he wascooperating. Some of this nominal information turned out to beextremely important. 14 The fact that Zubaydah gave us KSM's alias is the final nail inthe coffin of the argument that Zubaydah was not a senior alQaeda operative. If Zubaydah were not in the senior echelons ofal Qaeda, how on earth would he have known the secret codename for al Qaeda's top operational commander?